Electronically Filed

11/1/2019 1:42 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Karel Lehrman, Clerk ofthe Court
By: Brad Thies,

IN

Deputy Clerk

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
N0. 46805-2019
Plaintiff—Appellant,

Kootenai County Case N0.
CR28-2018—15354

V.
VVVVVVVVVV

CODY LEIGH HANSEN,
Defendant—Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

HONORABLE CYNTHIA K.C. MEYER
District

Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN

BEN P. McGREEVY

Attorney General
State 0f Idaho

Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

COLLEEN D. ZAHN
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal

322 E. Front St., Ste. 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 334-2712
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us

Law Division

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
E-mail: ecf@ag.idah0.gov
P.

ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF—APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT—RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...........................................................................................................

ARGUMENT IN REPLY
The
A.
B.

District

ii

................................................................................................................ 1

Court Erred

By Granting Hansen’s Motion T0

Suppress

................................ 1

Introduction ..............................................................................................................

1

Argument That Sgt. Sprout’s Search Of Hansen’s
Was Justiﬁed Pursuant To The Traditional Fourth
Amendment Balancing Test Is Preserved ................................................................ 1
The

State’s

Vehicle

C.

The State’s Argument That Hansen Failed T0 Unequivocally
Revoke The Consent Provided By His Probation Agreement
Is Preserved Because The District Court Decided This Issue .................................. 6

CONCLUSION

................................................................................................................................

9

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................................................... 9

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

M
Ada

Highway Dist.

Cntv.

Fairchild

V. State,

V.

Pizzuto

V. State,

Inc.,

162 Idaho 138, 395 P.3d 357 (2017) ...........

128 Idaho 311, 912 P.2d 679 (Ct. App. 1996)

Com,

2, 5,

7

...................................................

2

513 U.S. 374 (1995) .......................................................... 3

146 Idaho 720, 202 P.3d 642 (2008)

....................................................................

2

........................................................................

2

....................................................................................

5

................................................................................

1,

4

Cowen, 104 Idaho 649, 662 P.2d 230 (1983) .....................................................................

5

V. State,

Rawlings

V.

Samson V.
State V.

Brooke View,

Nat’l R.R. Passenger

Lebron

Porter

V.

w

136 Idaho 257, 32 P.3d 151 (2001)

Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980)

California,

547 U.S. 843 (2006)

State V. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 961 P.2d 641 (1998)

State V. Ellis, 155 Idaho 584,

314 P.3d 639

State V. Garcia—Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271,

State V. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95,

State V. Harris, 132 Idaho 843,

App. 2013)

6, 7, 8

......................................................

3,

4

396 P.3d 700 (2017) ................................................

2,

6

2, 5,

7

....................................................................

5

...................................................................

5

(Ct.

439 P.3d 1267 (2019)

979 P.2d 1201 (1999)

State V. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217,

State V. Jeske, 164 Idaho 862,

.............................................................

443 P.3d 231 (2019)

.........................................................

436 P.3d 683 (2019) ....................................................................

7, 8

State V. Pruss, 145 Idaho 623, 181 P.3d 1231 (2008) ...................................................................... 5

State V.

Vaughn, 164 Idaho 545, 432 P.3d 991

United States

V.

Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001)

(Ct.

App. 2018) ..................................................

...........................................................................

ii

6, 8

1,

4

ARGUMENT IN REPLY
The
A.

District

Court Erred

By Granting Hansen’s Motion T0

Suppress

Introduction

In

motion

its

Appellant’s brief, the state argued that the district court erred

t0 suppress evidence recovered during a trafﬁc stop.

Speciﬁcally, the state argued that the search of Hansen’s vehicle

Amendment

traditional Fourth

that

even

if he

balancing

test.

could have effectively done

so,

(Id.,

pp.6-14.)

(Id.,

are unpreserved, and, in

pp. 14-17.) In response,

any event,

fail

0n

(Appellant’s brief, pp.6-17.)

was justiﬁed pursuant

t0 the

In the alternative, the state argued

Hansen did not unequivocally revoke

search his vehicle that he granted pursuant to the Fourth

probation agreement.

by granting Hansen’s

Amendment waiver

Hansen contends

that

his consent t0

contained in his

both of these arguments

their merits. (Respondent’s brief, pp. 14-37.)

The

state

submits this reply brief to respond t0 Hansen’s preservation arguments, and contends that both 0f

its

assertions raised

on appeal are preserved.1

Argument That Sgt. Sprout’s Search Of Hansen’s Vehicle Was Justiﬁed
Pursuant To The Traditional Fourth Amendment Balancing Test Is Preserved

B.

The

State’s

In

Appellant’s brief, the state argued that Sgt. Sproat’s search 0f Hansen’s vehicle was

its

justiﬁed pursuant t0 the traditional Fourth Amendment balancing test as set forth in United States

V.

Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) and

brief, pp.6-14.)

1

The

Samson

V.

California,

547 U.S. 843 (2006).

Hansen’s signiﬁcantly reduced expectation 0f privacy, the

state relies

upon and adopts

concerning the merits 0f the issues

it

its

brieﬁng from

raises

0n appeal.

its

(Appellant’s

state asserted, as

Appellant’s brief for

its

arguments

evidenced primarily by his Fourth Amendment waiver and his status as a probationer, justiﬁed the

When balanced

search

against the state’s legitimate and signiﬁcant interest in supervising

probationers convicted 0f felony offenses.

upon below,
the issue

it

effectively

the state submits that

its

(Id.)

Though not

precisely the

position on appeal constitutes a

new argument

did previously set forth, or alternatively, an evolved argument

withdraw his Fourth Amendment waiver and preclude

same argument

relied

in support

of

— Whether Hansen could

Sgt. Sproat’s search

0f his

vehicle.

Appellate court review

were presented below. State

The

V.

is

generally limited t0 the evidence, theories, and arguments that

Garcia—Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017).

appellate court will not address claims

Pizzuto

V. State,

on appeal

that

were not asserted

146 Idaho 720, 735, 202 P.3d 642, 657 (2008); Porter

262, 32 P.3d 151, 156 (2001); Fairchild

V. State,

in the pleadings.

V. State,

E

136 Idaho 257,

128 Idaho 311, 318, 912 P.2d 679, 686 (Ct. App.

1996)
However, an argument made

Ada

Cntv.

Highway

(2017). In State

V.

Dist. V.

in support

Brooke View,

Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95,

Inc.,

0f an issue raised below

may

evolve 0n appeal.

162 Idaho 138, 142 n.2, 395 P.3d 357, 361

_, 439 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2019), the Idaho Supreme

Court explained the Brooke View holding as follows:

0n a horse that has been
and
reshod
for
the
appellate
Whereas Garciaprocess,
Rodriguez exempliﬁes a party entering the appellate process riding a similarlooking but entirely new horse. A groomed horse is expected on appeal, but a
In other words, Brooke View portrays a party riding

groomed

different horse is forbidden.

n.2.

The United
respect to

States

Supreme Court has described

“groomed” arguments

its

similar preservation jurisprudence with

as follows:

Our traditional rule is that once

a federal claim

is

properly presented, a party

can make any argument in support of that claim; parties are not limited to the
precise arguments they made below. Lebron’s contention that Amtrak is part of the

Government
a

is

View not a new claim within the meaning of that rule, but
support what has been his consistent claim: that Amtrak did not

in our

new argument t0

accord him the rights

it

was obliged

to provide

by

the First Amendment.

Lebron V. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Com, 5 13 U.S. 374, 379 (1995)

(internal quotations, citations,

and

brackets omitted).
In the district court, the state argued that

Hansen consented

to Sgt. Sprout’s search

of his

vehicle through the Fourth Amendment waiver contained in his probation agreement. (R., pp. 122123; TL, p.105, L.10

unilaterally

withdraw

—

p.114, L.11.)

this consent. (R.,

this proposition, the state,

among

The

state also

pp.122-123;

argued that Hansen was not permitted t0

Tr.,

p.106, L.25

— p.114,

L.11.) In support of

other things, noted Hansen’s signiﬁcantly reduced expectation

of privacy as a probationer, and cited State

V. Ellis,

155 Idaho 584, 3 14 P.3d 639 (Ct. App. 2013),

a case in which the district court and the Idaho Court of Appeals discussed the reduced privacy
expectations of probationers and parolees, as well as the policy considerations relevant to the

prospect of a parolee’s ability to unilaterally Withdraw terms of a supervision agreement (R., p. 123;

Tr.,

p.108, L.24

The

— p.109,

state’s

L.18).

argument 0n appeal,

like its

argument below,

relies

Hansen’s consent to search his vehicle as granted through his Fourth
state

has not argued that the Fourth

Amendment

upon the existence 0f

Amendment

waiver.

The

permits a suspicionless search of a probationer

where there

is

n0 Fourth Amendment waiver 0r consent

Hansen was permitted

Amendment argument

On

to unilaterally

raised

to

conduct such searches. Therefore,

m

and effectively Withdraw

on appeal pursuant

Qigm and

to

appeal, the state has simply argued that the consent provided

if

his consent, the state’s Fourth

by

would be compromised.

the probation agreement not

only directly justiﬁed the search, but also reduced Hansen’s expectation of privacy relevant to the
traditional Fourth

Amendment

balancing

test.

E Qigﬂ,

order clearly expressed the search condition and Knights

534 U.S.

at

119-120 (“the probation

was unambiguously informed of it. The

probation condition thus signiﬁcantly diminished Knights” reasonable expectation of privacy”) In
other words, the state

by revoking

L25 —

now asserts that Hansen could not increase his expectation ofprivacy simply

the consent contained in his probation agreement.

p.107, L.3), the state

is

As

it

argued below (TL, p.106,

thus seeking to “give[] teeth t0 Fourth

Amendment

waivers by

probationers.”

T0

this end, the state also

made arguments below

appeal (Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-13), concerning

withdraw

their

Fourth

Amendment

waivers

at

how

(in the context

made by

version of

overwhelming

t0 those

arguments

by probationers (Which were

the state t0 the district court below), are speciﬁcally relevant only to the traditional

Fourth Amendment balancing

The

state’s

Such arguments, similar

regarding the signiﬁcantly reduced expectation of privacy enjoyed
also

ﬂ) and on

allowing probationers t0 effectively

any time would defeat the

legitimate interest in supervising probationers.

0f citing

state thus

its district

test that the state

submits that

its

now raises on appeal.

appellate argument represents a

“groomed”

(or “evolved”)

court argument, particularly in comparison t0 recent cases Where the Idaho

Supreme Court precluded
t0 apply

Brooke View.

appellate arguments under

E

its

issue preservation doctrine after declining

State V. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217,

_, 443 P.3d 231, 234-235 (2019)

(declining t0 consider state’s appellate argument that the plain-View exception to the warrant

requirement justiﬁed ofﬁcer’s search where below, the state
warrant exception

—

consent); Gonzalez, 165 Idaho at

consider defendant’s appellate argument that she

date that

Bannock County placed an

another county,

When

Bannock County

Additionally, the state asserts that

suppress.

balancing

E

it

raises

entitled to credit for time served

was

on her while she was

entitled to time served

is

trial

t0 suppress that the search

of his vehicle was unconstitutional

623, 626, 181 P.3d 1231, 1234 (2008) (citing Rawlings

Cowen, 104 Idaho 649, 65 1 662 P.2d 230, 232
,

motion

to

be the party to raise the

979 P.2d 1201, 1205 (1999) (allowing one party t0

V.

By

asserting in his

(R., pp.55-56),

0n the burden of proving an intrusion of some expectation 0f privacy.

State V.

entirely

court t0 be preserved for

seek review 0f an issue raised by opposing party in intermediate appeal).

motion

from an

Virtue 0f Hansen’s

that the party taking the appeal

State V. Harris, 132 Idaho 843, 847,

in custody in

expectation-of—privacy—based traditional Fourth

on appeal was preserved by

n0 requirement

from the

warrant).

Although issues must generally be raised before the

appellate review, there

issue.

test

its

only an entirely different

_, 439 P.3d at 1269-1272 (declining t0

incarceration “hold”

she only argued below that she

different time, the issuance 0f the

Amendment

was

set forth

State

V.

Hansen took

Pruss, 145 Idaho

Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980);

(1983)). In other words,

Hansen necessarily

argued that he possessed an expectation of privacy signiﬁcant enough to constitutionally preclude

the search. That

Hansen

failed to

meet

this

burden

is

a central

component of the

state’s

argument

0n appeal.

The

state contends, as

provided by the Fourth

it

did below, that Hansen could not effectively revoke the consent

Amendment waiver

in his probation

agreement t0 preclude Sgt. Sproat’s

search 0f his vehicle. This Court can therefore consider the merits 0f this argument 0n appeal.

Argument That Hansen Failed T0 Unequivocallv Revoke The Consent
Provided BV His Probation Agreement Is Preserved Because The District Court Decided
The

C.

State’s

This Issue
In

its

appellate brief, the state argued that even if Hansen could have effectively

the consent and Fourth

Amendment waiver

the facts demonstrated that

response,

fails

0n

Hansen contends

its

argument

is

district court ruled

As noted

above, issues

Rodriguez, 162 Idaho

When an

issue

641, 644 (1998);

ﬂ

at

is

upon

may

it

so.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-17.) In

not preserved for appeal, and in the alternative,

merits. (Respondent’s brief, pp.29-37.)

because the

occurs

associated with his probation agreement, a review 0f

Hansen did not unequivocally do
that this

The

state asserts that the

below, and that this Court

argument

may therefore

is

preserved

consider

generally not be raised for the ﬁrst time on appeal.

it.

GLcia-

275, 396 P.3d at 704. However, one exception t0 this general principle

decided by the

trial court.

State V. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d

also State V. Vaughn, 164 Idaho 545, 548-549,

432 P.3d 991, 994-995

App. 2018) (acknowledging the DuVault preservation exception but holding
t0 preserve a suppression issue for appeal

404(b) motion. The

withdrawn

district court

that

When the issue was only raised in the

it

(Ct.

did not apply

context of an I.R.E.

could not “decide” a motion that was never presented t0

it,

and

where there was no evidence upon which

it

could

make

the factual ﬁndings necessary t0 a

suppression ruling.)

Even

in light

of the Idaho appellate courts’ recent reiteration of the appellate preservation

doctrine} the Idaho Supreme Court again recently utilized the DuVault exception in State

164 Idaho 862, 867-868, 436 P.3d 683, 688-689 (2019). In

m,

during the underlying

V.

Jeske,

trial,

defendant sought the redaction 0f Video evidence 0f his refusal to engage in ﬁeld sobriety

Li The

district court rejected the request,

and stated

that “the refusals t0

sobriety test[s], the breathalyzer, and t0 submit t0 a blood

Li.

On

submit

tests.

engage in the ﬁeld

t0 consciousness

of guilt.”

appeal, Jeske sought to challenge the trial admission of Video evidence 0f his refusal to

t0 the

though the
Li.

draw goes

the

The

blood draw, even though he did not make

state thus

state

this

speciﬁc argument below, and even

had n0 opportunity t0 submit evidence 0r argument speciﬁc

argued that

this

argument was not preserved for appeal.

t0 that assertion.

The Idaho Supreme

I_d.

Court held that “even though Jeske’s counsel did not explicitly mention the blood draw
point in time, the judge speciﬁcally identiﬁed the blood draw in her ruling.
issue regarding Jeske’s refusal t0 submit t0 the blood

.

..

at

one

Consequently, the

draw was ruled 0n, preserved, and

Will be

addressed in this appeal.” Li.

2

The

_,

Gonzalez 165 Idaho at
439 P.3d at 1271, the Idaho Supreme
both the issue and the party’s position 0n the issue must be
raised before the trial court for it t0 be properly preserved.” Because the Court made this statement
in the context 0f its analysis of the Brooke View “claim evolution” preservation doctrine, and
several weeks after Gonzalez, the DuVault exception to the
because the Court decided
state

acknowledges

Court provided

that in

that, “[t]0

be

clear,

m

appellate preservation requirement

is still

applicable.

In this case, the state did not expressly raise an argument that

consent granted in his probation waiver agreement.
L. 11.)

p.

1

The

14, L.

state also did

1 1 .)

not expressly concede the point.

However, similar

t0 the district courts in

court decided the relevant issue.

forth

by Hansen

that,

(E R., pp.

1

Hansen

15-124;

T11,

failed to

revoke the

p.105, L.10

— p. 1 14,

(m R., pp. 115-124; Tn, p.105, L. 10 —

m M,
and

the district court in this

The court construed one 0f the grounds

for suppression as set

“[d]efendant revoked his consent to search the vehicle”; and concluded that

Hansen’s motion t0 suppress
the warrantless search

is

“is

granted because [d]efendant revoked his consent t0 search and

not otherwise reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,” and that

“it

was

not reasonable for Sgt. Sproat t0 rely 0n [d]efendant’s advance consent given pursuant t0 a waiver

when

[d]efendant subsequently revoked his consent to search the vehicle.” (R., pp.174, 179, 204

(emphasis omitted).)
In fact,

0n appeal, Hansen has argued,

the state has “failed t0

show

in the alternative to his preservation argument, that

that the district court’s factual

ﬁndings that Mr. Hansen revoked his

consent are clearly erroneous.” (Respondent’s brief, pp.34-37.) With respect t0

argument, the state simply submits that

acknowledges was made by the

was evidence before the

it is

district court.

district court

preservation

permitted to challenge this conclusion that Hansen

The

state further notes that unlike in

m,

there

by Which it could make this conclusion — speciﬁcally, a Video

of the entire trafﬁc stop and testimony from Sgt. Sproat. (State’s Exhibit

L3.)

its

2;

Tn, p.15, L.12

— p.79,

The

state’s

his probation

argument

argument

is

that

Hansen

failed to unequivocally revoke the consent provided

preserved because the

therefore address the merits of this issue

district court

decided

this issue.

This Court

by

may

on appeal.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court to vacate the

district court’s

order granting

Hansen’s motion t0 suppress and to remand for ﬁlrther proceedings.

DATED this

1st

day ofNovember, 2019.
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